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INTRODUCTION 
On September 17, 2011, protestors descended upon New York 
City’s Financial District, announcing that they were occupying Wall 
Street to call attention to the country’s growing income disparities 
and other injustices.1  The first three reported arrests were of 
protestors who were accused of wearing masks in public.2  Another 
woman was arrested on graffiti charges after drawing on the sidewalk 
with chalk.3  As participants marched north toward Union Square one 
week after the Occupy Wall Street (“Occupy”) protests began, 
tension between police and protestors escalated with approximately 
 
* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University.  I am 
thankful to the Fordham Urban Law Journal for the opportunity to participate in the 
Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, to Lenese Herbert, Bennett Capers, and other 
colloquium participants for their helpful comments, and to W. Thomas Hughes for 
his invaluable research assistance. 
 1. Colin Moynihan, Protesters Find Wall Street Off Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2011, at A22. 
 2. Colin Moynihan, Wall Street Protests Continue, With at Least 6 Arrested, 
N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (Sept. 19, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://cityroom.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2011/09/19/wall-street-protests-continue-with-at-least-5-arrested/. 
 3. Id. 
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eighty arrests and the use of pepper spray by police officers.4  
Protestors posted video footage of the arrests on Facebook, Twitter, 
and other social networking sites, calling attention to a growing 
movement.5  By winter of 2012, Occupy had spread to more than one 
hundred cities across the country, and clashes between protestors and 
police clad in riot gear became familiar.6 
At a party the following spring, a friend of mine who is a New York 
Police Department (NYPD) detective told me that the media were 
speculating that the NYPD had acted unlawfully by checking whether 
participants in the Occupy Wall Street movement were subject to any 
outstanding arrest warrants.  Because I teach Criminal Procedure, I 
immediately thought through the Fourth Amendment analysis.  
Neither inquiring about a person’s identity nor checking a database 
for warrants is itself a restraint on liberty or invasion of privacy, and 
therefore such investigations need not be justified.7  Even if the 
warrant check occurred after a seizure, the seizure would be lawful as 
long as an objective justification existed; an individual officer’s 
subjective desire to use the seizure as a pretext to determine the 
person’s identity and the presence of any outstanding warrants would 
not affect the lawfulness of the seizure.8  However, I then considered 
the question through the lens of the First Amendment and Equal 
Protection.  Critics, I explained, would argue that a check for 
warrants, if based solely on a person’s participation in a protest, 
discriminates on the basis of the exercise of a fundamental right.9 
 
 4. Colin Moynihan, 80 Arrested as Financial District Protest Moves North, N.Y. 
TIMES CITY ROOM (Sept. 24, 2011, 8:31 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/09/24/80-arrested-as-financial-district-protest-moves-north/. 
 5. Jillian Dunham, Protests Stir Up Voices on the Web, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM 
(Sept. 30, 2011, 10:35 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/protests-
stir-up-voices-on-the-web/. 
 6. According to Occupy Wall Street supporters, in the year following the 
movement’s formation with the first New York City protest, police made 7,623 
arrests in 120 different cities. See OCCUPYARRESTS.COM, http://occupyarrests. 
moonfruit.com/ (last updated May 13, 2013) (tallying a running total of the number of 
arrests made in the United States since September 17, 2011).  
 7. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004); 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). See 
generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that police activity 
constitutes a search only if it implicates reasonable expectations of privacy). 
 8. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816–19 (1996). 
 9. Alisa Chang, Using NYPD Warrant Squads to Monitor Protesters May 
Violate Constitution: Experts, WNYC NEWS (May 4, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/ 
articles/wnyc-news/2012/may/04/using-police-warrant-squads-monitor-occupy-wall-
street-protestors-may-be-unconstitutional-legal-experts-say/ (“Executing old 
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I might have forgotten about the brief conversation with my friend 
if I hadn’t watched three days earlier as uniformed officers descended 
upon my neighborhood in anticipation of an Occupy march to Union 
Square Park.  Marked patrol vehicles lined both sides of Fourteenth 
Street.  Officers stood side to side, legs spread in a triangle stance.  
From their body language, I gathered that they were showing their 
power, preparing for confrontation, although no protest crowds had 
yet arrived.  I assumed at the time that if I construed the image in that 
light, protestors would as well.  That protest, which Occupy 
supporters later called the “May Day Siege by NYPD,”10 ended with 
the arrests of at least thirty demonstrators and “occasionally bloody 
clashes” between police and protestors.11 
On further reflection, I realized that I had missed an opportunity to 
answer my detective-friend’s question with another question: Why?  
Even if the law permits warrant checks, why use an Occupy protest as 
an opportunity for mass warrant checks any more than the NYPD 
would take the same action at an afternoon street fair or outdoor 
concert? 
Fast forward two months.  I was in Portland, Oregon, where I used 
to be a prosecutor.  As I drove past City Hall, I noticed what 
appeared to be an extensive makeshift campsite outside.  But in 
addition to the sleeping bags and blankets, I saw handmade signs.  
When I saw some of my local friends later in the week, I asked them 
about the scene.  Their frustration was clear.  The protest of the city’s 
anti-camping laws had been going on for more than a month, but the 
police so far had been leaving the protestors alone, even though at 
least some of the protestors’ activities were in violation of the law.12  
It was time to start making arrests, my friends suggested.13  I 
 
 
warrants—no matter how minor—is legal.  But legal experts say the tactic becomes 
illegal if it is done solely to investigate political activity.”). 
 10. See OCCUPYARRESTS.COM, http://occupyarrests.moonfruit.com (last updated 
May 13, 2013) (arrest data for May 1, 2012).  
 11. Andy Newman & Colin Moynihan, At May Day Demonstrations, Traffic 
Jams and Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at A20.  Supporters of OWS claim that 
the protest resulted in 97 arrests. OCCUPYARRESTS.COM, http://occupyarrests. 
moonfruit.com/ (last updated May 13, 2013) (arrest data for May 1, 2012).  
 12. See Chase G. Hall, Portland Hunger Striker, Supporters Camp Outside City 
Hall, OREGONLIVE.COM (July 3, 2012, 7:31 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
portland/index.ssf/2012/07/protesters_camped_in_front_of.html. 
 13. Others have suggested that cities have not been sufficiently aggressive in 
enforcement against protestors. See Chip Johnson, Oakland Blames Police, Not 
Occupy Mobs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2012, at C1. 
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remembered my conversation with the NYPD detective.  I thought 
about all those officers lining the street outside my apartment.  I 
remembered hearing neighborhood residents wonder aloud why 
police didn’t just leave the protestors alone. 
This Essay explores the policing of protestors, but it does so in a 
very limited way.  It does not attempt to explore the many disturbing 
claims that have arisen from the Occupy movement about the legality 
of individual police responses.  Rather, it looks solely to the issue of 
police discretion in enforcing criminal law against protestors, 
assuming that criminal law has been violated14 and that a police 
response would be lawful, both substantively and procedurally.  
Specifically, the Essay looks beyond formal law to the literatures on 
procedural fairness and community policing to discern neutral 
principles to govern the exercise of police discretion in this context. 
Part I of the Essay provides an overview of the role that discretion 
plays in the policing of protests, presenting the potential for both 
overenforcement and underenforcement of criminal law.  Part II 
looks to the principles of community policing and procedural justice 
to guide the exercise of police discretion.  In Part III, an application 
of those general principles to the policing of protestors exposes 
tensions that exist between community policing and procedural 
justice philosophies, but also indicates the importance of ex ante, 
transparent, and neutral decision making by law enforcement. 
I.  DISCRETION IN ENFORCEMENT 
Policing the conduct of contemporary social movements raises 
several issues of formal law.  Protestors and their supporters argue 
that police have used excessive force in attempting to restrain and 
arrest protestors,15 that police have fabricated the facts used to justify 
 
 14. To be clear, “the Occupy Wall Street movement expressly embraces 
nonviolence (and for the most part has been nonviolent).” Bernard E. Harcourt, The 
Politics of Incivility, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 345, 356 (2012).   
 15. A report from the Protest and Assembly Rights Project alleges a broad 
pattern of aggressive policing against the Occupy movement. SARAH KNUCKEY ET 
AL., THE GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC & THE WALTER LEITNER INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS 
CLINIC, SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE 
TO OCCUPY WALL STREET (2012), available at http://chrgj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/suppressingprotest.pdf (alleging a pattern of aggressive 
policing against the Occupy movement).  Multiple lawsuits have been filed alleging 
excessive force against protestors by the New York Police Department. See Margaret 
Hartmann, NYPD’s Occupy Pepper Spraying Sparks More Lawsuits, Calls for Police 
Oversight, N.Y. MAG. (July 31, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/ 
2012/07/nypds-occupy-pepper-spraying-sparks-new-lawsuit.html. 
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police responses,16 that law enforcement has resorted to intrusive and 
unlawful domestic surveillance in monitoring the activities of 
protestors,17 and that laws restricting the use of public spaces violate 
the First Amendment.18  But even assuming that police conduct is 
supported by formal law, questions of police discretion remain.  
When should police enforce criminal law against protestors, and when 
should they opt for non-enforcement?  And, if police are going to 
intervene, how aggressive should their actions be?  Should they warn 
the protestors?  Issue a citation?  Arrest? 
Policing of protestors can raise problems of both over- and under-
enforcement.  Traditionally, criminal justice scholars have focused on 
the problem of overenforcement of criminal law, arguing that 
overenforcement unleashes undeserved punishment, 
disproportionately targets minority groups, and reduces individual 
incentives to comply with criminal law.19  Applied in the protest 
context, concerns about overenforcement could include concerns 
about over-criminalization of conduct perceived to be harmless or 
minor,20 such as public camping or wearing masks in public.21  
 
 16. In New York, for example, protestors who were charged with disorderly 
conduct claimed that police intentionally led protestors onto an area of the Brooklyn 
Bridge where pedestrians were not permitted. See Andrew Keshner, ‘Public’ Tweets 
Are Subject to D.A.’s Subpoena, Judge Says, N.Y. L.J. (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202561602402.  
Prosecutors subpoenaed protestors’ Twitter posts to demonstrate that protestors 
knew the area was off-limits. Ross Buettner, A Brooklyn Protester Pleads Guilty 
After His Twitter Posts Sink His Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A31. 
 17. See KNUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15 (alleging surveillance by the NYPD); 
Linda Lye, Spying on Occupy?, ACLU N. CAL. (July 17, 2012), 
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/freedom_of_press_and_speech/spying_on_occupy.shtm
l (alleging surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
 18. See generally Sarah Kunstler, The Right to Occupy—Occupy Wall Street and 
the First Amendment, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 989 (2012) (arguing that sleeping and 
camping outdoors constitutes speech that should be protected); Udi Ofer, Occupy the 
Parks: Restoring the Right to Overnight Protest in Public Parks, 39 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1155 (2012). 
 19. See generally David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A 
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); Tracy 
Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police 
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271 (1998); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: 
The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal 
Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001); William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal 
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006). 
 20. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 
710 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 505 (2001) (arguing that broad codes overcriminalize behavior and expand 
law enforcement power). 
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Overenforcement can also raise separate concerns about selective 
enforcement,22 if protestors believe that the law is being enforced 
against them disproportionately because of their involvement in a 
protest movement.23  And it can raise concerns about the degree of 
law enforcement’s response, such as complaints that police used 
excessive force or resorted to custodial arrests when lesser 
interventions would have sufficed.24 
More recently, scholars have called attention to the potential 
harms of underenforcement of criminal law.25  The failure of police to 
enforce criminal law can embolden criminals, undermine public 
safety, and deteriorate expectations about law enforcement’s 
willingness to protect members of society equally.  Complaints about 
underenforcement in the protest context could come from 
neighborhood residents and other private citizens who believe that 
the protests infringe on their property rights.26  Neighborhood 
 
 
 21. One much-discussed arrest in New York was of a 56-year-old woman who was 
knitting in a folding chair, because chairs in the park were prohibited. Colin 
Moynihan, At Least 4 Arrested at Zuccotti Park After Occupy March, N.Y. TIMES 
CITY ROOM (July 12, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/07/12/at-least-3-arrested-at-zuccotti-park-after-occupy-march.  
 22. See Roberts, supra note 19, at 1007–09. 
 23. See Gina Barton, March to Protest Death in Police Custody Ends in 4 Arrests, 
MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL ONLINE, Nov. 12, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/ 
news/milwaukee/march-to-protest-death-in-police-custody-ends-in-four-arrests-
c87k34k-179026431.html (quoting protestors who claimed that police arrested them 
as punishment for having participated in an Occupy protest); Barry Grey, Occupy 
Protests Targeted by FBI Counterterror Units, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Dec. 
27, 2012), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/12/27/poli-d27.html (alleging that 
municipal police and the FBI are engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine the 
Occupy Protests). 
 24. KNUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15; Hartmann, supra note 15. 
 25. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998); Dan 
M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1153 (1998); Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct 
“Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 617, 627–28 (2006); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1721 (2006) 
(delineating when underenforcement of criminal law is normatively troublesome); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996) 
(identifying “anomalous zones” in which “certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as 
embodying policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended”); William J. 
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (1998). 
 26. In New York City, for example, the initial site of Occupy’s activities was 
Zuccotti Park, a privately owned but publicly accessible park in lower Manhattan. 
See Janos D. Marton, Representing an Idea: How Occupy Wall Street’s Attorneys 
Overcame the Challenges of Representing Non-Hierarchical Movements, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1140 (2012). 
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residents might also complain that the disorder resulting from public 
camping and other minor offenses contributes to a deterioration of 
the neighborhood and could contribute to a general sense of 
lawlessness.27  Underenforcement of criminal law against protestors 
can also lead to concerns about equity if police appear to be 
tolerating conduct from one group of individuals that it would not 
tolerate from others.28 
II.  LOOKING BEYOND FORMAL LAW: PROCESS AND COMMUNITY 
Formal law does little to prevent either overenforcement or 
underenforcement.  The law gives police broad discretion to act in the 
face of unlawful conduct.  Temporary restrictions on liberty are 
permitted as long as reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is 
present.29  A custodial arrest is permissible as long as probable cause 
exists to believe the arrestee has committed a crime,30 no matter how 
minor the offense.31  An officer who is justified in stopping or 
arresting an individual may also use reasonable force to effectuate the 
seizure,32 and courts are generally deferential to officers in 
determining whether the level of force used was reasonable.33 
Formal law is even more deferential to police discretion when they 
choose not to enforce the law.34  Absent discriminatory motivations 
 
 27. James Wilson and George Kelling’s influential “broken windows” theory 
posits that low-level disorder contributes to more serious crime if left uncorrected. 
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29–38.  
 28. See Lenese C. Herbert, O.P.P.: How “Occupy’s” Race-Based Privilege May 
Improve Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence for All, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 727, 731–
35 (2012) (noting that Occupy protestors are primarily white and appear to expect 
better treatment from police than minority communities have experienced). 
 29. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 30. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415 (1976). 
 31. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008) (holding that a custodial 
arrest for a misdemeanor was valid even when the state legislature had designated 
the crime a non-arrestable crime); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 320–
21 (2001) (holding that a custodial arrest for a seatbelt offense was lawful, even 
though the maximum penalty was a fine, because the offense was designated a crime 
by the legislature). 
 32. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98–99 (2005); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 396 (1989) (noting that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop 
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat 
thereof to effect it”).  
 33. E.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–86 (2007). 
 34. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413, 1492 (1989) (noting that because the Constitution does not obligate the 
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against a protected class, police have unfettered discretion not to 
arrest a person, despite the strength of the evidence, just as 
prosecutors can choose to decline charging.35  As Alexandra Natapoff 
has observed, “Jurisprudentially speaking, underenforcement is a 
non-issue.”36  Principles of both procedural justice and community 
policing demonstrate, however, that the desirability of police conduct 
generally, and exercises of discretion in particular, should not be 
determined solely through a jurisprudential lens. 
A. Procedural Justice 
Although an exhaustive discussion of the lessons of procedural 
justice would go beyond the scope of this Essay, the truncated version 
of the central thesis of procedural justice is this: When people 
perceive a decision-making process to be fair, they are more likely to 
accept the outcome of that process, even if the decision itself is 
adverse.37  Thanks to the influential work of social psychologist Tom 
Tyler and other scholars, we know that public perceptions about 
fairness are derived from four distinguishable factors.  First, people 
are more likely to be satisfied with a process when they have been 
given an opportunity to participate by expressing their side of the 
story.38  Second, perceptions of fairness are higher when people 
perceive the decision maker to be neutral.39  Third, people are more 
satisfied when authority figures are perceived as having acted out of a 
 
 
government to enforce the law, “random underenforcement is not constitutionally 
objectionable”). 
 35. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).   
 36. Natapoff, supra note 25, at 1756. 
 37. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of 
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003); Tom Tyler, Peter Degoey & Heather Smith, 
Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures Matters: A Test of the 
Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model, 70 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 913 (1996); see also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 196 (2002) 
(“[P]eople’s main consideration when evaluating the police and the courts is the 
treatment that they feel people receive from those authorities.”). See generally JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 14 (1971). 
 38. Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS 84 (2004); Tom R. 
Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for 
Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 355, 379–80 (2003).  
 39. Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: 
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 255 (2004). 
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sense of care and benevolence for them.40  Fourth, people care about 
how they are treated.  When authorities treat them politely and with 
dignity and respect, they are more likely to perceive the process as 
fair.41 
Procedural justice research has important implications for policing.  
Psychological research demonstrates that perceptions about the 
fairness of law enforcement’s conduct drive the public’s acceptance of 
law enforcement’s legitimacy, separate from the lawfulness of police 
action.  For example, in a recent study, Tracy Meares, Tom Tyler, and 
Jacob Gardener measured the relationship between people’s 
assessment of police conduct and both the legality of the officer’s 
conduct and the perception of the officer’s procedural fairness.42  
They did this by showing subjects videos in which police were 
depicted as wielding some level of authority, ranging from verbal 
commands to the use of force, over a stopped person.43  Prior to 
watching a video, subjects were told whether there was a lawful basis 
for the police conduct.44  After watching the video, subjects were 
asked to evaluate the police along the various dimensions of 
procedural fairness.45  Subjects were then asked to rate their desire to 
punish the officers.46  This design permitted the researchers to divide 
the resulting data (how much to punish) into four groups of police 
encounters: 1) lawful encounter with high procedural justice; 2) lawful 
encounter with low procedural justice; 3) unlawful encounter with 
high procedural justice; and 4) unlawful encounter with high 
procedural justice.47 
Meares et al. found that the lawfulness of the police conduct had 
only a small, if any, effect on subjects’ desire to punish the officers.48  
For example, among groups who perceived there to be a high level of 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 38, at 380; see also Michael M. O’Hear, 
Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420–24 (2008) 
(summarizing procedural justice theory). 
 42. Tracey L. Meares et al., The Two Different Worlds We Live In: Lawfulness 
and Perceived Police Misconduct (Yale Law Sch., Public Working Paper No. 255, 
2012). 
 43. Id. app. B at 2. 
 44. Id. at 16.  For example, some were told that police stopped a suspect for 
driving “erratically,” while others were told that the stopped person was driving 
lawfully. Id.   
 45. Id. app. B at 2–3. 
 46. Id. app. B at 3. 
 47. Id. at 17. 
 48. Id. at 18 fig.2. 
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procedural justice, subjects who witnessed an unlawful encounter 
reported, on average, a desire to punish of 1.39,49 while subjects who 
witnessed a lawful encounter reported a desire to punish of 1.36.50  
When procedural justice was low, subjects who witnessed an unlawful 
encounter reported a desire to punish of 2.25, compared to 2.10 for 
subjects who witnessed a lawful encounter.51  Those same data tell a 
different story about the effect of procedural justice.  Subjects who 
perceived high procedural justice had low inclinations to punish 
(either 1.36 for lawful encounters or 1.39 for unlawful), while subjects 
who perceived low procedural justice were much more desirous of 
punishment (2.10 for lawful encounters, 2.25 for unlawful).52 
Perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy affect not only public 
sentiment toward authority, but also actual conduct.  By 
demonstrating that people are more likely to comply with rules when 
they are viewed as legitimate,53 the procedural justice literature adds 
an important dimension to the usual deterrence-based crime-control 
model of punishment.54  While traditional deterrence theory posits 
that people comply with the law to avoid sanction, social scientists 
have found a direct relationship between compliance with the law and 
perceptions about the legitimacy of the authority underlying the law.55  
People are also more likely to cooperate with law enforcement when 
they perceive law enforcement’s authority to be legitimate.56  Not 
surprisingly, perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy can be 
driven by individual experiences: 
 
 49. Id.  Subjects were asked to number the intensity of their desire to punish, on a 
scale from 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating a greater desire to punish. Id. at 18 
n.56. 
 50. Id. at 18 fig.2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
 54. See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer 
to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 984–85 (2000) 
(“Research findings demonstrate that both specific decisions and more general laws 
and public policies are difficult to enforce using threats of punishment.”). 
 55. Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 
391, 400 (2000) (summarizing research); Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a 
Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of 
Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 707, 716–17 (2000). 
 56. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People 
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 267 
(2008) (“Cooperation increases not only when the public views the police as effective 
. . . but also when citizens see the police as legitimate authorities who are entitled to 
be obeyed.”). 
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Personal experience does have political impact.  The judgments of 
adults about their obligation to follow legal authorities respond to 
their experiences with particular police officers and judges.  Because 
experience influences legitimacy, legal authorities cannot take 
citizens’ allegiance for granted.  It can be eroded by unsatisfactory 
experiences with police officers or judges.  And legitimacy will be 
eroded if the legal system consistently fails to meet citizens’ 
standards.  On the other hand, the existing reserve of legitimacy can 
be increased over time by positive personal experiences with police 
officers and judges.57 
The procedural justice literature teaches us, then, to look beyond 
the lawfulness of police conduct to other normative factors.  Law 
enforcement’s willingness to listen, neutrality, respect, and caring 
affect perceptions of law enforcement’s legitimacy, which in turn 
affect compliance with substantive criminal law and cooperation with 
police.  Accordingly, procedural justice factors should help shape law 
enforcement’s exercise of discretion. 
B. Community Policing 
Another model of policing that offers lessons for the exercise of 
police discretion comes from the community justice movement.  
Although the term “community policing” can be elusive, it is perhaps 
best understood in contrast to the rapid-response model of policing 
that was dominant through most of the twentieth century.  In rapid-
response policing, law enforcement reacts to crimes as they occur.58  
Its goal is to identify a suspect, gather sufficient evidence to arrest 
and charge the suspect, and then to prosecute and punish the offender 
for the offenses charged.59  In this form of law enforcement, each 
actor serves a limited purpose.  Police become involved only after a 
crime has occurred, prosecutors step in once evidence has been 
gathered against a suspect, and citizens are relevant only to the extent 
they serve as suspects, complainants, witnesses, or jurors.60  When law 
enforcement takes action—a stop, an arrest, the filing of criminal 
charges—the rapid-response model looks to formal law to determine 
 
 57. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 53, at 106. 
 58. Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions 
of Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 286–87 (2012). 
 59. Id. at 287. 
 60. Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former 
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 992 (2003); Anthony C. 
Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 339 
(2002). 
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the lawfulness of governmental conduct.61  When a shortage of 
resources forces law enforcement to opt for underenforcement or 
non-enforcement, the rapid-response model looks to the criminal 
code for guidance, prioritizing serious offenses over petty ones.62 
The community justice movement, in contrast, calls for greater 
involvement of and cooperation with communities at every stage of 
the justice system.63  A model of community cooperation can affect 
exercises of discretion in multiple ways that contrast with rapid-
response policing.  First, in community policing, law enforcement 
must look to community members not merely as complainants and 
witnesses, but as “stakeholders” who not only help police identify 
community concerns, but also help develop and even implement 
responsive strategies.64 
Community policing also affects law enforcement’s discretion in 
prioritizing resources.  In identifying the most important community 
concerns, participating stakeholders will look more to their everyday, 
real-world problems rather than to the ranking of criminal offenses as 
defined by the formal criminal code.  Accordingly, in community 
policing, police often exercise their discretion by addressing low-level 
crimes that might not warrant attention in comparison to more 
serious crimes, but which the community views as detrimental to their 
 
 61. Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 415–16 
(2000) (noting that police are limited by statute and exceeding that statute is 
“generally a violation of local and federal law”). 
 62. Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 288; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION & DEF. FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b)(ii)–(iii) (1993) (listing “the extent of the 
harm caused by the offense” and “the disproportion of the authorized punishment in 
relation to the particular offense or the offender” among factors relevant to the 
decision to prosecute).  
 63. See Heymann, supra note 61, at 420 (2000); Debra Livingston, Police 
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the 
New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 575 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for 
Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1600 (2002). 
 64. Of the jargon that emerges from community justice programs, one of the most 
frequent terms is “stakeholder.” See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and 
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 457, 502 (2000) (discussing the role of “stakeholders” in shaping norms under 
new policing approaches); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: 
A Restorative Justice Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 720 (2000) (noting the importance of “stakeholder” 
agreement in restorative justice programs); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy 
and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410 (2000) (noting that participation of 
community “stakeholders” legitimizes government action).  
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quality of life.65  The enforcement of desirable social norms, rather 
than the criminal code itself, is often the focus of community policing.  
For example, while formal law prohibits the enactment of vague 
criminal prohibitions, scholars who support community policing have 
advocated for giving law enforcement discretion to enforce 
community norms that are often ambiguous.66  Similarly, in the name 
of community, cities have enacted or increased the enforcement of 
substantive criminal laws that are focused more on social compliance 
than traditional criminal punishment, such as prohibitions against 
public camping,67 panhandling,68 and loitering.69 
Moreover, because police look to affected stakeholders in 
identifying, prioritizing, and responding to community problems, 
community policing tends to be extremely localized.70  One 
neighborhood’s biggest problem could be a red-light district with a 
proliferation of sex shops and visible prostitution activities.  In 
another neighborhood, domination of public spaces by gang members 
or drug dealers could be the driving concern.  To residents and 
business owners in another district, graffiti and loud skateboarding 
could be of paramount importance. 
 
 65. Eric W. Nicastro, Confronting the Neighbors: Community Impact Panels in 
the Realm of Restorative Justice and Punishment Theory, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 261, 261 (2003).  Advocates of devoting resources to minor, quality of life 
offenses often invoke the broken windows theory in support. See Kelling & Wilson, 
supra note 27. 
 66. For more thorough discussions of the role of enforcement of social norms in 
community policing efforts, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367–77 (1997); Livingston, supra note 63, at 578–84; 
Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 377 (2001); 
Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to 
Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 1253, 1256–58 (2000). 
 67. See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302–06 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562–84 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 68. See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 701–06 (2d Cir. 1993) (striking 
down an ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of panhandling); Helen 
Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the 
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 896 n.5 (1991) (summarizing laws regulating 
panhandling). 
 69. See Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About 
Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 143; Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and 
Race, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 129 (2000) (arguing that gang influence on 
“community mores” undermines the inner cities’ chances for revitalization). 
 70. Archon Fung, Beyond and Below the New Urbanism: Citizen Participation 
and Responsive Spatial Reconstruction, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 615, 629 (2001); 
Heymann, supra note 61, at 421 (“[P]olice are accountable to neighborhoods as well 
as to cities . . . .”). 
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Finally, community policing affects police discretion in devising 
responsive strategies to community crime concerns.  Rapid-response 
policing treats arrest, prosecution, and punishment as paramount 
objectives, necessary to achieve incapacitation and deterrence.71  
Perhaps because it often prioritizes low-level quality of life offenses 
rather than serious crimes with immediate, identifiable harms, 
community policing treats arrest, prosecution, and punishment as a 
means to the end of improving community satisfaction.72  If 
enforcement of criminal law against individual offenders on a reactive 
basis is necessary to solving community concerns, it can be part of 
community policing.  However, community policing tends to 
emphasize long-term, proactive crime-prevention strategies over 
short term, reactive ones.73 
III.  DISCRETION, POLICE, AND PROTESTERS 
A superficial comparison of community policing and procedural 
justice might suggest that the two theories would carry similar 
implications for the exercise of police discretion.  Both procedural 
justice and community policing theories look beyond formal law to 
other normative values, and both look specifically to the voices of 
citizens who are affected by police decision making to effectuate 
these values.  Community policing does so by emphasizing police 
cooperation with the public and the prioritization of long-term 
problem solving over criminal punishment for its own sake.  
Procedural justice does so by encouraging police to give suspects a 
voice and by treating them without bias, with respect and dignity, and 
with a sense of caring and benevolence.  Although the two theories 
have different emphases, they both tend broadly to evoke images of a 
more democratic, transparent, and accountable form of policing.  But 
a deeper attempt to apply these shared principles in the context of 
policing protestors reveals potential tensions between the two 
policing theories. 
 
 71. See Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 287, 291. 
 72. This model of “problem solving” policing is often attributed to Herman 
Goldstein. See generally HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 
(1990); Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 
CRIME & DELINQ. 236 (1979). 
 73. Heymann, supra note 61, at 420 (“[O]ur policing strategies in the last decade 
have turned heavily towards prevention of crimes . . . rather than individual events.”). 
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A. Rules of Engagement: Communication and Transparency 
Both procedural justice and community policing principles suggest 
that guidelines for police discretion in the protest context should be 
both ex ante and transparent.  Ad hoc decisions by individual officers, 
especially in the chaotic environment of mass protest activity, will 
inevitably lead to variations in treatment, which undermine the 
perception of neutrality.74  Moreover, by its very definition, ad hoc 
discretion also undermines community policing’s goal of preventing 
problems before they occur through ex ante problem solving rather 
than reacting to them.75  Instead, police should adopt guidelines about 
what type of conduct will trigger what level of police response, and 
should make these guidelines available to protestors and the public. 
Moreover, police should develop these guidelines not unilaterally, 
but in cooperation with the affected community.  Permitting 
community input to shape the rules of engagement advances both 
community policing’s emphasis on public participation and 
procedural justice’s emphasis on giving voice to those affected by 
police decision making.76  There is, however, a potential difference 
between procedural justice and community policing principles on the 
question of which constituencies’ opinions are relevant. 
In community policing, police are encouraged to partner with 
“stakeholders,” a population that can include neighborhood 
residents, local businesses, schools, healthcare and social service 
agencies—“practically everyone,” as one scholar noted.77  The limited 
research seeking to describe the constituencies involved in 
 
 74. In other contexts, the contributory role of broad police discretion to unequal 
treatment is well explored. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 
(1999) (striking down a city ordinance aimed at gang-affiliated loitering in part 
because it was too vague to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979) (striking down wholly discretionary spot 
checks of vehicles in part because unfettered discretion could lead to ‘indiscriminate 
official interference’” (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 
(1975))). 
 75. Cf. Morales, 527 U.S. at 59 (reasoning that because an anti-gang loitering 
ordinance gave police discretion to issue an order to disperse “only after prohibited 
conduct has already occurred, it cannot provide the kind of advance notice that will 
protect the putative loiterer from being ordered to disperse”).  
 76. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453, 476 (1997) (“Criminal law rules can contribute to normative forces; they 
can shape, alter, and guide those forces, but only if the community accepts the law as 
a legitimate source of moral authority.”). 
 77. David Thacher, Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 765, 765 (2001) (noting that community policing attempts to incorporate 
“practically everyone”). 
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community policing reports that residential involvement is often 
dominated by older, whiter, and wealthier neighborhood residents.78  
Business owners, whose values may differ from those of residents, 
may have the ability to garner disproportionate attention by 
providing funding to some of the public-private partnerships involved 
in community policing programs.79  Because the rhetoric of 
“community” is simultaneously popular and elusive, scholars have 
warned that it can be co-opted by unrepresentative or majoritarian 
populations.80  For example, one could imagine the NYPD justifying 
aggressive police tactics against Occupy Wall Street through the lens 
of community policing.  Zuccotti Park, the original location for the 
movement’s “occupation,” is privately owned.81  It is surrounded by 
the country’s financial center, still raw from the largest mass murder 
on American soil.  Nearby is Tribeca, a neighborhood favored by 
families with young children.82  Consulting only with “stakeholders” 
seeking enforcement against the collateral effects of speech activities 
would lead to very different police strategies than if demonstrators 
and their supporters dominated the conception of “community.”  For 
this reason, several scholars have noted the importance of including 
diverse and representative voices in the community policing process.83  
While community is intended to shape the exercise of police 
 
 78.  See Michael E. Buerger, A Tale of Two Targets: Limitations of Community 
Anticrime Actions, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 137, 137–38 
(David R. Karp ed., 1998); Wesley G. Skogan, Community Organizations and Crime, 
in 10 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 39, 68 (Michael Tonry & Norval 
Morris eds., 1988); Bernard E. Harcourt, Punishment and Crime: Policing L.A.’s Skid 
Row: Crime and Real Estate Redevelopment in Downtown Los Angeles (an 
Experiment In Real Time), 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 325, 329.  
 79. Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 305 (noting the role that private actors and 
funding can play in community justice programs). 
 80. I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 
77 (2009) (noting that “one of the unexplored drawbacks of community policing” is 
that “police receive their cues from society”); Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 304–
09; Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
359, 381 (2005). 
 81. Kunstler, supra note 18, at 1017. 
 82. Tribeca, STREET ADVISOR, http://www.streetadvisor.com/tribeca-manhattan-
new-york-city-new-york (last visited Mar. 24, 2013); Tribeca Demographics, ZILLOW, 
http://www.zillow.com/local-info/NY-New-York/Tribeca-people/r_270951/ (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 83. See, e.g., Green & Burke, supra note 58, at 305; Tracey L. Meares, Social 
Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 215–17 (1998) 
(discussing the concept of “linked fate,” both generally as with people who care 
about how government policies affect loved ones, and specifically in African 
Americans, who feel connected to Black strangers because of shared historical 
circumstances). 
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discretion, the very determination about which community members 
to communicate and work with is itself discretionary. 
In contrast, the theory of procedural justice makes clear that police 
should listen not only to those who complain to police about 
underenforcement, but also to the populations who will potentially be 
policed.  Procedural justice scholars emphasize this point directly by 
teaching us that people are more likely to view police action as fair, 
and will therefore be less likely to break the law and more likely to 
comply with police, when they are given a chance to have their voices 
heard.84  Applied to Occupy Wall Street, the lesson of procedural 
justice is that police should meet not only with segments of the 
population who believe they are inconvenienced or harmed by 
protest activities, but also the protestors themselves, including those 
most likely to violate the law. 
When I was a community-based prosecutor,85 we would meet in 
advance with protest organizers and agree to the rules of engagement.  
Protestors knew what activities were lawful (or would be tolerated 
through underenforcement), what would be treated with a citation, 
and what would trigger custodial arrest.  Demonstrators who wanted 
to be arrested for civil disobedience reasons were given “easy” ways 
to break the law.  These arrestees would be taken away with plastic 
zipties on their wrists.  Protestors who went beyond the agreed upon 
norms were subjected to the usual custodial process. 
Opponents of including protestors in the conversation that shapes 
the exercise of police discretion might argue that a group like Occupy 
Wall Street is impossible to negotiate with because of its unique 
nature.  Occupy is largely non-hierarchical, with no named leaders or 
organizers.86  However, as it continues, it has become more organized, 
though still driven by individuals.87  Moreover, the level and means of 
 
 84. See Tom Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 THE ANNALS 84 (2004); 
Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation 
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 355, 380 (2003).  
 85. See Burke, supra note 60 (drawing on my experience as part of Portland, 
Oregon’s “Neighborhood District Attorney” program). 
 86. See Sandra D. Jordan, Victimization on Main Street: Occupy Wall Street and 
the Mortgage Fraud Crisis, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485, 491 (2011); Marton, supra 
note 26, at 1109. 
 87. For example, the New York City General Assembly represents itself as 
“dozens of groups working together to organize and set the vision for the 
#occupywallstreet movement.” About, #OCCUPY WALL STREET N.Y.C. GEN. 
ASSEMBLY, http://www.nycga.net/about/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).  The resulting 
“Internet working group” has been described by one its creators as the movement’s 
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communication used by protestors to communicate gathering times 
and locations with one another, and to publicize its confrontations 
with police, should be sufficient for police to communicate as well.  
Occupy has been especially successful at publicizing its activities via 
websites, message boards, Facebook, and Twitter.88  Law enforcement 
could use these same online tools to communicate guidelines and 
decisions with transparency and to encourage increased cooperation 
between police and protestors. 
Another potential conflict between community policing and 
procedural justice theories is in the ultimate goals that should guide 
police discretion.  Community policing emphasizes long-term 
problem solving, but, just like the meaning of community, the terms 
“problem” and “solving” are ambiguous.  Consider, for example, the 
possible problems reported to the police by mass demonstrations in 
lower Manhattan as protestors move from the Financial District up to 
Union Square Park.  Concerns from residents could be as varied as 
litter, noise, blocked traffic, trespassing, or fears of violence.  
Concerns by protestors, if permitted to participate in the shaping of 
police guidelines as part of “community,” might be about fears of 
harassment or violence by opponents or police, or uncertainty about 
the scope of their constitutional rights (e.g., hours of park closure, 
street permit requirements, or noise restrictions against drums or 
amplification).   
How should the success of a community policing project be 
measured?  By an actual decrease in overall crime?  The prevention 
of serious crime?  A decrease in complaints?  An increase in overall 
satisfaction? 
In this context, again, procedural justice provides more specific 
guidance.  Thanks to procedural justice research, we know that 
perceptions of police fairness, specifically the perception of fairness 
demonstrated toward the policed, has instrumental value.89  People 
subject to police conduct not only report more satisfaction, but are 
also more likely to comply with law enforcement, when they perceive 
that they have received a fair process.90  Moreover, people who are 
 
 
“general assembly.” Adam Martin, Occupy Wall Street Is Building Its Own Social 
Network, ATLANTIC WIRE (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/ 
2011/10/occupy-wall-street-building-its-own-social-network/43637/. 
 88. See Jennifer Preston, Protesters Look for Ways to Feed the Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 2011, at A28. 
 89. See discussion infra Part II.A.  
 90. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.  
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outsiders to the encounter are also likely to feel better about police 
discretion when they perceive that police have given procedural 
fairness to the people they are policing.91  Here, the implications of 
the research are again clear: Police should not only listen to 
demonstrators; they should also treat them fairly.  Doing so not only 
will increase satisfaction in both protestors and those outsiders who 
are viewing the protests, but also increase the perception of police 
legitimacy, which in turn makes it less likely that protestors will 
violate the law or disregard police commands. 
B. Neutrality 
Although media reports about the policing of the Occupy 
movement have often focused on claims of excessive force, supporters 
of the movement have noted a separate concern about selective 
enforcement.  The New York Civil Liberties Union, for example, 
collates “Free Speech Threat Alerts” that highlight “under-the-radar” 
police activities that chill or punish the exercise of speech rights, 
including targeted surveillance and the selective enforcement of 
criminal law.92  Similarly, the Protest and Assembly Rights Project 
also focuses on selective enforcement in alleging a broad pattern of 
aggressive policing against the Occupy movement.93 
Both community policing and procedural justice principles would 
advise police to act neutrally toward protest movements.  This 
principle of neutrality means at the very least that law enforcement 
should police a Tea Party protest in the same way it polices an 
Occupy Wall Street protest.94  Preferential treatment based on the 
viewpoint of the speaker undermines the perceived legitimacy of law 
enforcement and serves no community justice values.  Police also 
should not enforce criminal law any more aggressively when it arises 
from protest activity than when it arises within any other group 
gathering in a public area.  Crimes like trespass, jaywalking, and 
blocking traffic are no more harmful when committed by a protestor 
than by a marathon observer or concertgoer. 
 
 91. See supra notes 38–52 and accompanying text. 
 92. See NYC Free Speech Threat Assessment, N.Y. C.L. UNION, 
http://www.nyclu.org/protest (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 93. See KNUCKEY ET AL., supra note 15. 
 94. Tea Party supporters have argued that big city mayors, whom they claim are 
more likely to be liberal, have shown favoritism toward the Occupy Wall Street 
movement by tolerating lawlessness by Occupy protestors. Alan Farnham, OWS 
Getting Under Tea Party’s Skin, ABC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Business/tea-party-response-occupy-wall-st/story?id=14985439. 
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There are two distinctions that police might, however, legitimately 
draw in their policing of protestors without necessarily violating 
principles of neutrality.  First, neighborhood differences might 
warrant more aggressive or different policing in one geographic area 
than another.  Here, community policing and procedural justice 
potentially carry different implications regarding geographic 
variations in the enforcement of criminal law.  Because community 
policing tends to define “community” geographically and then 
permits the defined community to help identify and prioritize quality 
of life concerns, geographic variations in police responses is not only 
tolerated but expected.  In the protest context, for example, one could 
imagine that the congested, business-focused Financial District would 
report more dissatisfaction with the potential collateral crimes 
associated with a protest movement than would constituencies on the 
Lower East Side of Manhattan.  Accordingly, police might be less 
likely to intervene with protest activity, even when in violation of 
formal law, if conducted in an acceptable, geographic zone.95  
Community policing’s emphasis on problem solving could lead to 
similar geographic disparities.  For example, thousands of protestors 
in the financial district or midtown Manhattan would be more 
disruptive to traffic than the same protest activities in a residential 
district.  Although the city could zone protest activity directly through 
the permitting process,96 police could also zone informally by using 
discretion to enforce a “zero tolerance” approach in congested areas, 
and taking a more lenient approach in less congested areas. 
From the perspective of procedural fairness, however, variations in 
enforcement based on geography could potentially undermine the 
perception of police neutrality.  If, for example, protestors are 
arrested in the Financial District for wearing masks when such 
conduct is tolerated on the Lower East Side, protestors could 
construe the disparity as creating a zone of privilege for the 
geographic area that symbolizes the economic policies that the 
Occupy movement is protesting.  Discrepancies in enforcement by 
 
 95. For further discussion of treating the enforcement of criminal law differently 
according to geographic distinctions, see Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic 
Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 
105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1219–46 (1996) and Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform 
Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of 
Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1166–82 (1999).  
 96. See Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment 
Protection of Special Places, 8 U. D.C. L. REV. 53 (2004) (describing the use of “free 
speech zones” to limit the geographic location of speech activity). 
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geography, if perceived as a sign of hostility toward the protestors in 
favor of the protested, would also undermine the perception that 
police are acting out of a sense of caring and benevolence toward 
protestors.  The risk of such perceptions could potentially be 
alleviated by giving careful regard to the other dimensions of 
procedural fairness. 
A second distinction police should consider is to underenforce 
criminal law in protest settings compared to other group settings.  As 
Alexandra Natapoff has noted, “[s]ome underenforcement practices 
are unfair, undemocratic, and harmful; others may be empowering, 
responsive, and helpful.”97  Specifically, she identifies 
underenforcement of minor offenses committed in the protest context 
as a place when underenforcement can serve desirable values: 
Although protesters often violate trespass, loitering, and other 
criminal laws, police routinely do not fully enforce these laws, opting 
for symbolic or partial enforcement in the spirit of the expressive 
nature of the protest.  We take it as a sign of social maturity that 
police do not fully enforce criminal laws against protesters, and we 
fear for our democracy when protesting lawbreakers are treated like 
traditional criminals without regard for the expressive or First 
Amendment values at stake.  In this context, underenforcement is a 
sign of truly responsive government, one that recognizes that not all 
laws deserve to be enforced all of the time and that principles of 
democratic accountability sometimes require law enforcement to 
make room for public deviance.98 
Randall Kennedy’s analogy of policing to a form of tax proves 
helpful here.99  In its original context, Kennedy’s argument identified 
the “racial tax” paid by African American communities to pay for 
aggressive police tactics.100  Kennedy and others have argued that the 
tax of policing should be paid equally.101  As noted above, at the very 
least, the policing tax imposed on Occupy protestors should be no 
higher than the tax paid by Tea Party protestors or marathon 
 
 97. Natapoff, supra note 25, at 1744.   
 98. Id. at 1743. 
 99. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997). 
 100. Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1999, at 30, 34 
(identifying “a special kind of tax for the war against illegal immigration, drugs, and 
other forms of criminality”).  
 101. Id. (arguing that the cessation of racial profiling would repeal the “racial 
character” of the “tax” for law enforcement); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: 
RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 54 (1999) (arguing 
that “well-to-do white people” would be more concerned about police tactics if they 
were routinely subjected to them). 
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observers or concertgoers.  Arguably, though, people who gather in 
large groups for the purpose of exercising speech rights should pay a 
lower tax than other groups that present similar order-maintenance 
challenges, because they are engaged in speech activities, whether the 
positions are favored or not, that are valued in a democracy. 
C. Culture 
Regardless of the content of the guidelines developed to govern 
police discretion in enforcing criminal law against protestors, police 
departments should emphasize to individual officers that the quality 
of their decision making is determined not solely by outcomes but by 
process.  This conclusion of course flows from procedural justice 
directly: Research demonstrates that people are more accepting of 
police decision making, independent of outcome, when they perceive 
it to be procedurally just.102  An emphasis on fair process is also 
consistent with community policing’s emphasis on long-term 
solutions.  Thanks to the work of Tom Tyler and others, we know that 
fair process in the long term drives outcomes because people are 
more likely to comply with law if they are treated fairly.103 
An emphasis on process has implications for police culture.  Police 
should be trained to treat protestors (and everyone else) with respect.  
Even if they opt for intervention or enforcement or both, they can do 
so with respect.  Here, I return to the anecdotal observations that 
gave rise to my interest in this Essay.  Although police in Portland 
have certainly clashed with protestors generally and with the Occupy 
movement in particular, I watched as officers approached protestors 
camping outside of City Hall.  They approached casually, coffee cups 
in hand.  They were there to “chat,” prepared to escalate the 
confrontation level if necessary.104  In contrast, the NYPD showed up 
for what became the May Day Siege with their fight faces on. 
 
 102. TYLER, supra note 53, at 5 (“Justice concerns are seen as acting independently 
of the influence of an outcome’s favorability.”); Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, 
Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of 
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 214 (2012) 
(“Critically, perceptions of procedural fairness are outcome independent.”). 
 103. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.  
 104. I confirmed my observations by meeting with a Portland Police Bureau 
Captain and Commander to discuss the Bureau’s policing of protestors.  As they 
described their philosophy, police have “nowhere to go” if they start with a “zero-
tolerance” attitude in “riot gear.”  They cannot “de-escalate.”  Moreover, they have 
been cautioned to avoid developing an “us versus them” culture. Notes from meeting 
at Portland Police Cent. Precinct (Aug. 1, 2012) (on file with author). 
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Specifically in the protest context, showing respect is not simply a 
matter of being polite, but about respecting the exercise of 
constitutional rights.  Police should not arrive to a protest with the 
perception that the demonstrators are the enemy.  In fact, they should 
not even view a protest as just another crowd control job.  The police 
are there not only to prevent protestors from causing trouble, but to 
protect them against those who would silence, harass, or harm them.  
The police, in short, are there not to police the protestors, but to be 
protectors and peacekeepers for everyone present. 
CONCLUSION 
The dangers of overenforcement and underenforcement apply 
equally to the policing of protestors as in other contexts.  Looking 
beyond formal law to community policing and procedural justice 
principles offers some guidance as to best practices for the exercise of 
police discretion in enforcing criminal law against protestors.  At the 
same time, however, examination of the community policing and 
procedural justice principles in this context reveals potential tensions 
between the two theories. 
